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DevOS

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Seeking help and geeking out together on https://github.com/divnix/devos & https://github.com/divnix/digga10 Servers

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25 Oct 2021
@timdeh:matrix.org@timdeh:matrix.org speaking of which, I found yet another pass like yesterday 😅
https://share-secrets-safely.github.io/cli/compare.html
17:48:20
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)If we plug an encryption workflow in front of it, then we need things like git smudge/clean or direct tf support for encrypted state fules.17:48:38
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)* If we plug an encryption workflow in front of it, then we need things like git smudge/clean or direct tf support for encrypted state files.17:48:52
@timdeh:matrix.org@timdeh:matrix.orgI was just considering if it would be possible to do some weaker form of forward secrecy with git and gpg by simply having a tool generate a new subkey on each commit, and burning it after each subsequent change to secrets 🤔17:51:48
@timdeh:matrix.org@timdeh:matrix.orgusually with perfect forward secrecy that temporary session key would live only in memory, so it's not quite "perfect" forward secrecy, but it would be an improvement over having the entire agenix and/or git-crypt history accessible from the same key17:52:26
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)
In reply to @timdeh:matrix.org
speaking of which, I found yet another pass like yesterday 😅
https://share-secrets-safely.github.io/cli/compare.html
I have the impression that somebody needes a divnix/data-merge but for injecting secrets. This is interesting since pure nix does not allow to inject attributes.
18:02:44
@timdeh:matrix.org@timdeh:matrix.orgthat sounds like a very interesting idea, in theory at least 🤔18:03:44
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)

One pattern could be, though:

inputs.secrets.url = "path:./secrets.json where sheesy does preprocessing to (ehm) write secrets.json.

18:03:45
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao) Or: we add pass-cpmpliant prim-ops to nix. 18:04:29
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao) builtins.fromPass -- a sheesy like built-in. 18:04:45
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)* Or: we add pass-compliant prim-ops to `nix`.18:04:59
@timdeh:matrix.org@timdeh:matrix.org the main reason I find sheesy interesting after reading up on it a bit is that they eventually plan to migrate to sequoia-pgp, which has a lot of interesting features and seems a lot more user friendly than gnupg 18:05:04
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)* Or: we add pass-compliant primop to `nix`.18:05:08
@timdeh:matrix.org@timdeh:matrix.orgin particular, I read a whitepaper about including some sort of forward secrecy directly into sequoia yesterday. Not sure how far along that's come implementation wise though.18:05:33
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao) They should just fork and push work on age. 18:06:14
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao) Maybe it's time to think about a "special" input for flakes. 18:07:04
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)Such input, ingesta secrets, but otherwise tries to be as friendly as possible to the evaluation cache and makes sure that secrets do have string contexts which prevents decrypted versions thereof to be written to disk.18:07:49
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao) Or a builtin that obly takes effect on nix eval but obfuscates on nix build. 18:08:25
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)* Or a builtin that only takes effect on `nix eval` but obfuscates on `nix build`.18:08:31
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)* Such input, ingests secrets, but otherwise tries to be as friendly as possible to the evaluation cache and makes sure that secrets do have string contexts which prevents decrypted versions thereof to be written to disk.18:08:42
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)
In reply to @blaggacao:matrix.org
Or a builtin that only takes effect on nix eval but obfuscates on nix build.
I like this better.
18:09:49
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)There is no language-conform way to handle secrets in the nix store without implementing an entire encryption framework.18:10:36
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)* There is no language-conform way to handle secrets in the nix store without implementing an entire _opinionated_ encryption framework.18:10:50
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao)Nah, still a bad idea all together. Otoh, all that can be dome with pre-processing probably can be done with IFD-like.18:12:16
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao) Or what's the deal with builtins.exec? 18:12:33
@timdeh:matrix.org@timdeh:matrix.orgI dunno, doesn't seem safe so I haven't use it 😅18:12:49
@timdeh:matrix.org@timdeh:matrix.org * I dunno, doesn't seem safe so I haven't used it 😅18:13:36
@blaggacao:matrix.orgDavid Arnold (blaggacao) allow-unsafe-native-code-during-evaluation 18:14:07
@genadij.udarov:matrix.orggenadij.udarov
In reply to @timdeh:matrix.org
I wonder if committing the tfstate file would be a possible solution 🤔
We used to do that back in like 2016 or so, but realised that using S3 as a backend for the tfstate was better. :-D
18:14:15
@timdeh:matrix.org@timdeh:matrix.orgwe use a vault-plugin for our tfstate atm18:14:43

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