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NixOS Security Triage

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Coordination and triage of security issues in nixpkgs216 Servers

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5 Jul 2024
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa pinged elvishjerrico in #dev:nixos.org 11:54:40
@raitobezarius:matrix.orgraitobezariusi'm confused by the reports11:57:01
@raitobezarius:matrix.orgraitobezariusit took me time to reload the context11:57:05
@raitobezarius:matrix.orgraitobezariusbut BIOS GRUB users are protected by cryptodisk11:57:13
@septem9er:fairydust.spaceSeptem9er
In reply to @emilazy:matrix.org
https://github.com/NixOS/calamares-nixos-extensions/pull/25 says "#21 broke encrypted swap by mishandling the removal of crypto_keyfile.bin. This reverts the original fix. Instead, we leave BIOS the same; that was secure as it was before", I guess this was just a misunderstanding of the vuln? :/

Thanks, I didn't look at the pull request yet.

They also write:

NOTE: This is likely not a completely sufficient solution for users who choose manual partitioning. Mainly, if they create an unencrypted root partition with BIOS boot, it will still insecurely use crypto_keyfile.bin for other partitions that are encrypted.

Since they are specifically writing about unencrypted root partitions only, it seems like they thought it wouldn't be an issue for an encrypted root partiton?

Anyway, I guess this was a misunderstanding about the vulnerability. BIOS setups were definitly affected, the GHSA did specifically say it affects "non-UEFI systems".

11:57:52
@emilazy:matrix.orgemily
In reply to @raitobezarius:matrix.org
but BIOS GRUB users are protected by cryptodisk

the advisory says

Users who installed NixOS through the graphical calamares installer, with an unencrypted /boot, on either:

  • non-UEFI systems
11:58:16
@emilazy:matrix.orgemily I guess the key there is "unencrypted /boot"? 11:58:22

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