| 17 Jul 2021 |
 Mic92 | Passwords need to be at some point in memory | 08:05:43 |
| Mic92 | It's different when you use the yubi key to authenticate remotly against a different system. | 08:06:15 |
| Mic92 | Than you never need to have the key in host memory | 08:06:32 |
 andi- | My threat is more about local code execution stealing keys | 08:09:46 |
| Mic92 | The key for what? | 08:11:03 |
| Mic92 | A second use case for TPM would be second factor auth | 08:15:48 |
| Mic92 | Also interesting: https://github.com/mtth-bfft/tpm-otp | 08:18:28 |
| andi- | In reply to @mic92:nixos.dev
The key for what? The key for the passwords. | 08:47:47 |
| Mic92 | In reply to @andi:kack.it
The key for the passwords. It seems like a small win in security for an increased complexity, since the passwords itself are still in plain | 08:48:57 |
| andi- | Yeah but it defeats all kinds of offline attacks on my password database | 08:49:24 |
| andi- | you can use my entire disk and still have no way to decrypt my passwords. Not even if you also have a memory dump. | 08:49:38 |
| andi- | You only obtain what you can observe me requesting. | 08:50:02 |
| Mic92 | I can imangine for most people the risk of loosing access to all their passwords is higher when their hardware breaks than the added security. | 08:51:56 |
| Mic92 | * I can imagine for most people the risk of loosing access to all their passwords is higher when their hardware breaks than the added security. | 08:52:18 |
| andi- | I would only loose access to keys on that machine and not all my passwords. | 08:52:50 |
