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27 Jun 2026
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)publicly exposed on hydra.nixos.org12:05:08
@emilazy:matrix.orgemilybut yeah "key signs the next one" in some form or another is ultimately what you get. it doesn't necessarily mean teaching Nix about certificates though12:05:10
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)already deployed, sorry :)12:05:17
@emilazy:matrix.orgemilyright I just mean you can't just trust TLS or w/e12:05:23
@emilazy:matrix.orgemilybecause then you might as well skip the key12:05:36
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)we should get DNSSEC12:05:42
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)that shit is so complicated that attackers tend to forget it is in place12:06:00
@emilazy:matrix.orgemilyif you secure the transit enough that you feel you can trust any key coming down the wire then you don't need to sign the packages at all12:06:20
@emilazy:matrix.orgemilytlog as key distribution mechanism would work though :)12:06:56
@joerg:thalheim.ioMic92
In reply to @hexa:lossy.network
already deployed, sorry :)
Okay should be fine
12:07:27
@elisaado:elisaado.comEli Saado it depends on the threat model, transit can be very secure but if the server serving the packages is compromised an attacker can still serve malware if packages aren't signed 12:07:27
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)I mean, we trust the key currently sitting on github in nixpkgs12:07:57
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)so we could also just fetch that12:08:03
@emilazy:matrix.orgemilyideally we get Nixpkgs signed too one day12:09:23
@emilazy:matrix.orgemilyyes my point is that if you fetch new package signing keys like that without some other chain of trust then you can still do that12:09:54
@wamserma:nixos.devwamsermatlog sounds nice. + publishing a hash in a few different places as RoT?12:10:16
@emilazy:matrix.orgemilytbh Merkle tree certs is what would be ideal, but that'd be a whole thing to teach Nix about12:10:16
@emilazy:matrix.orgemilyyou can do better than that12:10:27
@emilazy:matrix.orgemilyhttps://witness-network.org/12:10:38
@emilazy:matrix.orgemilyespecially with WebPKI adopting MTCs with tlogs as the source of truth for certs there's a lot of nice things happening12:11:19
@wamserma:nixos.devwamsermadid someone mention SLSA yet?12:13:09
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)yes, tooon in 202212:13:58
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)Redacted or Malformed Event12:14:03
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)Redacted or Malformed Event12:14:09
@wamserma:nixos.devwamserma(just being snarky, going full SLSA would be leaping instead of taking this in reasonable steps)12:15:26
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)given that this rom is lossy12:15:43
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)Redacted or Malformed Event12:15:49
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)y'all should schedule a meeting and discuss options12:15:58
@hexa:lossy.networkhexa (signing key rotation when)and come back with a protocol12:16:03
@wamserma:nixos.devwamsermai can offer this as a thesis topic :)12:20:24

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